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The Context 
In 1990, the Maltese Government submitted its formal application 
to become an EU member. In the same year, an incomes policy -
under the auspices of a tripartite forum (the Malta Council for 
Economic Development) - was set up to direct industrial relations 
towards a more consensual ethic. These two events occurred at a 
time when the liberalisation of the market, initiated in 1987 
following the victory of the Nationalist Party (NP) at the polls, 
was gathering momentum. Concurrently, the intensification of 
international trade was obliging many governments to restructure 
their economies in line with the demands of a globalised market. 
The year 1990 thus seems to mark a watershed in the Maltese 
socio-economic scenario. This paper reviews the flash points of a 
decade when the Maltese labour market, either by default or by 
design, seemed to orient itself more towards European standards. 
The recent intensification of international trade has meant that 
many economic sectors hitherto protected by national legislation 
have had to face international market competition. In order to 
keep its competitive edge with U.S.A. and Japan in this expanded 
world market, the European Union has tried to seek a higher level 
of integration between its member states. The creation of a single 
currency, as well as of a single internal market, and the privatisation 
of such services as telecommunications, electricity and utilities, 
were all based on this general rationale. Naturally, such policies 
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ushered in new social and economic problems in the field of 
industrial relations. 
During the 1990's, many European Governments had to grapple 
with acute and chronic high unemployment levels and the 
inflationary effects of the deregulation of the market. In their efforts 
to restore and maintain competitiveness, they tried to adopt a policy 
of wage restraint. To reach the targets set in the Maastricht Treaty 
and qualify for European Monetary Union membership, some 
European Governments took unilateral decisions such as wage 
freeze and tight pay guidelines for negotiations in the public sector. 
Governments regarded wage moderation as the main instrument 
for controlling inflation since wages tend to represent a major 
component of production costs. 
The responses by trade unions to these new developments were 
both reactive and proactive. In their efforts to maintain the 
purchasing power of workers' wages, unions consistently sought 
to ensure adequate compensation for the deflationary measures 
taken by governments. At the same time, they tried to ensure job 
security through an active involvement in national employment 
policy. As an economic strategy of lowering the unemployment 
rate, they sought to reduce working time. For a number of sectors 
and groups, particularly in France, Germany and the Netherlands, 
this demand for a reduction in working time was pursued with 
much vigour and formed an important item on the negotiation 
agenda (Fajertag, 1994, p. 291). Employers, on their part, seemed 
more willing to engage in this debate because they saw it as a 
means of obtaining more flexible patterns of work. Thus, a law 
was passed in France stating that working time could be extended 
up to forty eight hours a week without payment of overtime as 
long as the weekly average would not exceed 37 hours over a period 
of one year. This law made provisions for cuts in contributions by 
employers who reduce working time and recruit new workers 
(Fajertag, 1997, p. 26). 
It should also be noted that wage restraint was, notably in Ireland, 
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Italy and Finland, the result of a tripartite pact or incomes policy 
agreement (Fajertag, 1996, p. 30). To legitimate their actions, 
Governments preferred to adopt a policy of consensus through 
social dialogue rather than coercion. Lang et al. (1995) dismiss as 
mere speculation the belief that corporatism was weakened due to 
the pressures of globalisation and deregulation. Their empirical 
study on six corporatist countries (Austria, Germany, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden) indicates that macro corporatism 
in these countries was still considered to be a viable alternative to 
a less static system even though they noted that, especially in 
Denmark and Sweden, "bargaining clearly became more 
decentralized" (ibid.) p. 96). In their review of industrial relations 
in 17 European states (the EU 15 plus Switzerland and Norway), 
Ferner & Hyman (1998, p. xx) note that there was a "persistence and 
indeed revival of central coordination and concertation in Europe 
in the 1990's". By and large, all governments preferred to pursue 
change through agreement with social partners. "Efforts by 
governments to exclude the social partners - in particular the unions 
- from their reform plans have tended to be unsuccessful: witness 
the failure of the Berlusconi initiative in Italy, or the outbreak of 
mass protests in France in December 1995" (ibid., p. xxi). 
Summing up here, the organization and ideology of trade unions, 
the strategies adopted by employers and the role played by the 
state are to be understood as only part of the wider context of 
industrial relations. Deflationary measures taken by policy makers, 
levels of unemployment, shifts in the occupational structure, 
changes in international market trends and their impact on national 
competitiveness all impinge on industrial relations systems. 
The Maltese Scenario 
This new economic scenario of the 1990's has had its impact on 
Maltese society. For a while, the belief may have prevailed that the 
Maltese economy was immune from the effect of this heightened 
Flashpoillts in Local Industrial Relations in the 1990s 31 
market competitiveness and could therefore continue to pursue a 
policy peculiar to the flexible exigencies of a micro, sovereign island 
state. However the logic of internationalism made us soon realize 
that insularity and size could not act as permanent shock absorbers 
to the vagaries of an intensified global and competitive regime. In 
the 1990's in Malta, as elsewhere in Europe, there was a broad 
acknowledgement of the need for restructuring the economy in 
accordance with the imperatives of the new economic scenario. 
For the 20 years before that, Maltese economic policy was 
dominated by the view that the state should participate directly 
in economic activity, especially where the private sector failed to 
take the initiative. The end result was a sustained policy of 
nationalization. This process targeted a number of existent 
enterprises (including the banks) and led to the creation of new 
public enterprises (such as Air Malta, Sea Malta, EneMalta and 
TeleMalta in the early 1970s). A policy of import substitution was 
also introduced in order to boost Maltese production and reduce 
the negative trade balance. The liberalization and 
internationalisation of the Maltese economy thus required the total 
restructuring of the Maltese economy that was embarked upon by 
the Nationalist Government, newly elected in 1987. This 
restructuring became more urgent in view of Malta Government's 
formal application, submitted in July 1990, to become a full 
member of the European Union. 
This decade is characterized by a government-driven initiative 
to liberalize and internationalise the economy and place it within 
the ambit of the free market economies. This plan entailed the 
removal of some protective barriers that sheltered local industry 
from open competition in the world market, the end of state aid 
for 'lame duck' industries propped up in order to avoid 
redundancies, the sale of a substantial percentage of Government 
shares in the banks to private investors and the setting up of a 
stock exchange to facilitate the circulation of stocks, shares and 
bonds. Even during the Malta Labour Party's brief tenure of office 
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from October 1996 to September 1998, this process was continued. 
Indeed, during these two years, the telecommunication sector was 
partially privatised and serious attempts were made to increase 
accountability in state subsidized enterprises for instance at Malta 
Drydocks. 
The restructuring necessary to ensure that all sectors of the 
Maltese economy are competing equally within the parameters of 
a free market economy was far from complete by the end of the 
nineties. This restructuring as elsewhere in Europe has had, and is 
likely to have, negative impact on certain industries, leading to 
closures and contractions. During this shift in the economy, the 
Maltese trade union movement maintained its central position and 
continued to register increases in membership. The industrial 
relations climate in the 1990's can be defined as relatively mild 
with the number of industrial disputes or person days lost being 
some of the lowest on record. The largest number of person days 
lost per annum due to industrial action during this epoch was just 
16,000 in 1996. 
In general, there was an "atmosphere of relative stability" which 
"can be attributed to the readiness of the social partners to work 
together in a highly competitive international market and to 
Govetnment's eagerness to solve industrial relations issues as soon 
as they emerge" (UNDP, 1996, p. 37). Yet, in spite of these efforts, 
there were confrontations between the social partners that 
threatened this apparent stability. What follows is an account of 
the major disputes between the social partners - hence flashpoints 
- which may have made the 1990's less stable than the statistics 
may suggest. Indeed, the ominous signs at the beginning of the 
decade did not augur for stability in industrial relations. 
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Social Dialogue: Unintended Consequence of an Industrial 
Dispute 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Malta Council for Economic 
Development (MCED) was set up to serve as a forum for discussion 
between the main social partners (Government, trade unions and 
the constituted bodies, including employers) by means of which 
they would try to find convergent lines rather than adopt a winl 
lose approach. However the conciliatory tone that this initiative 
tried to set in motion was not very much in evidence in the first 
part of the year. The Confederation of Malta Trade Unions (CMTU) 
in its new year message emphasized the big and deep rooted 
divisions within the trade union movement while the General 
Workers' Union (GWU) expressed concern with Government's 
confrontational stance. 
The cause of this confrontation was the Lm3 wage increase 
announced in the Budget that the Government embodied in a 
National Standard Order - Legal Notice 169 of 1989. This 
"standard order' obliged employers to pay only the increase agreed 
in the collective agreement and the difference if any to make a 
total ofLm3 per week as from January 1990. The CMTU and the 
GWU expressed their disapproval about this decision. They 
maintained that the Lm3 wage increase should be considered as a 
cost of living increase mandatory on all employers, irrespective of 
whether they had signed a collective agreement with a trade union. 
Confrontation 
The GWU insisted that employers should endorse the Lm3 weekly 
wage increase announced in the Budget for 1990, over and above 
any other increases included in any valid collective agreement. In 
the first weeks of January, the union registered a trade dispute 
with those enterprises that refused to accept this request. These 
were Simonds Farsons Cisk (SFC), Flour Mills, Corinthia Group 
(Hotel and Catering Services) and the Hotel Phoenicia that forms 
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part ofTrusthouse Forte Chain. By January y", an agreement was 
clinched with the Flour Mills and the Corinthia Group, where the 
workers were given a Lm3 weekly wage increase over and above 
the increases announced in the budget speech. In the case of 
Simonds Farsons Cisk, the GWU ordered an indefinite strike by 
the fork lifters, a work-to-rule directive to other workers and a 
directive to port workers not to handle merchandise connected 
with the company. The dispute dragged on for several weeks. The 
industrial actions were called off when discussions between the 
union and SFC management started, but only to be resumed when 
these discussions reached a deadlock. The company presented its 
case to the industrial tribunal and filed a lawsuit against the Cargo 
Handling Company for failing to release its merchandise sitting 
idle in the port. The GWU did not present its case before the 
tribunal, claiming that it had no confidence in its members. In its 
award, the tribunal declared that the industrial actions of the GWU 
were in violation of the extant collective agreement. The GWU, 
however, disputed this award, claiming that the clause in the 
collective agreement stipulated that any increase issued for the 
cost of living should be given over and above any wage increase 
agreed upon. The union maintained its defiant stand and accused 
the SFC management of lack of goodwill. On February 9th , six 
days after the announcement of the tribunal's award, discussions 
were resumed, and finally concluded. As a result, employees 
received a Lml weekly increase as from January 1st 1990, a Lm 26 
bonus in June 1990 and a Lm 2 weekly increase as from January 
1991. The collective agreement would be extended by another 
year and workers would receive two additional Lm20 bonuses each 
in 1992. A long and protracted confrontation was thus brought to 
a close. 
Meanwhile, the GWU had also ordered partial industrial action 
at the Hotel Phoenicia. A sit-in by kitchen staff and work to rule 
was imposed in the first week of January. This case took a unique 
twist, however, when Trusthouse Forte decided to close down the 
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hotel and dismissed all employees. 
In this dispute, neither side seemed willing to budge and both 
adopted a win/lose approach. Hotel management maintained that, 
by adhering to the clauses of the collective agreement, it was 
honouring its commitments. Its legal adviser was quoted as saying 
that the collective agreement specifically provided that any wage 
increase agreed upon was not to be taken as additional to any other 
increase (The Times, S .1.90). The Phoenicia management decided 
to give the Lm2 per week increase as stipulated in the collective 
agreement and another Lml per week to make up the difference 
for the Lm3 increase announced in the Budget. 
The private section organizations expressed their solidarity with 
the management of the Phoenicia Hotel. The employers' view was 
that they were in line with the collective agreement clause when 
they were providing for the award of the better of the two benefits 
(Lm3) and not their combination (LmS). The stand taken by the 
Phoenicia management was reinforced by the award of the 
Industrial Tribunal whose decision was that the GWU actions 
against Phoenicia were in violation of the agreement. 
The GWU - once again - did not present its submissions to the 
tribunal. It declared its lack of confidence in both the chairperson 
and employers' side representative who had been a member of the 
National Labour Board that had issued the National Standard 
Order. The union also expressed its surprise at the unanimous 
decision of this tribunal since one member, forming part of this 
tribunal, was an official of the CMTU. The latter had agreed with 
the GWU that the Lm3 wage increase should be considered as a 
cost of living increase and was therefore mandatory on all 
employers. The GWU also accused Government of playing about 
with words for "whilst de Jacto admitting the justification for such 
an increase, the Government resorted to legislative terminology 
in an attempt to confuse the issue. Indeed all trade unions agreed 
that the Lm3 increase is a cost of living increase" (The Times, 
29.1.90). The union requested direct talks with a representative 
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of the parent company of Phoenicia Hotel, stating that it was 
prepared to suspend its actions while talks were being held with 
the overseas representatives. This request was turned down. 
These exchanges became even more bitter when it was announced 
that the company was about to embark on a Lm3 million 
refurbishment project for the hotel. The union was accused of 
intransigence because, by its actions, it was stalling the 
implementation of this project. The union replied that it had never 
been informed about this project and added that a company which 
could afford a multi-million investment programme could spare a 
few thousand liri to its employees who were demanding a just cost 
of living increase. When the news was received that Ttusthouse 
Forte had decided to close down the hotel and dismiss all employees, 
the GWU accused the company that it had been orchestrating 
this move all along in order to release itself from the obligation of 
offering any compensation to the employees while the 
refurbishment project was in progress. However the decision by 
Trusthouse Forte to close down might not have come as complete 
surprise to the union. The Secretary General of the GWU on more 
than one occasion had stated that the union would not give up its 
claim even if the hotel were to close down. When the decision to 
close down the hotel was made known, the union asked the 
Government to use its legal means to appropriate the buildings -
a plea that went unheeded. 
Anti-Union Lobby 
In this conflict the union seemed to have had very few allies. As is 
to be expected its actions were denounced by various employers' 
associations. Neither did it receive any sympathy from 
Government. The Prime Minister was quoted as saying that unions 
requesting increases larger than those established by Government 
in a National Standard Order had to shoulder the responsibility of 
their actions (The Times, 8.l.90) while the Minister for Social 
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Policy accused the union of obstructionism. The MeED was not 
utilised as a forum to discuss this issue even though its chairman 
acted as a mediator. After the closing down of the Phoenicia the 
media (especially the English language papers) had very scathing 
remarks about the GWU policy. According to the editorial of The 
Times, the GWU had "emerged badly bruised from this conflict" 
and it recommended that the union should review its methods in 
view of "its present very low standing in the barometer of sober 
public opinion" (The Times, 22.2.90). 
This seemed to be the propitious time for the anti-union lobby 
to voice its concern about trade union power. The same editorial 
of 'The Times' advocated new positions on issues like sympathy 
strikes, secret ballots, check off dues, resignation mechanism and 
cooling off periods. The Federation of Industry (FOI) had already 
issued a statement arguing for an utgent tripartite review of 
industrial relations structutes by all parties with a view to reach 
consensus on necessary amendments to legislation, including 
legislative measures to ensure trade union liability for damages 
arising to employers out of non compliance by trade unions with 
legislation and/or rulings of a competent court or tribunal. 
In this issue the GWU, sought to challenge the policy of 
Government by not allowing it to define the framework within 
which it could bargain with employers (Grixti, 1994, p. 549). 
From the outcome of this dispute, it was evident that the union 
had not achieved its objective for it now "meant that at the micro 
level any employer wanting to reject the GWU's claim could do 
so while remaining within the agreed and accepted 
framework"(ibid.). 
Towards Social Dialogue 
However the Industrial Relations system is not a game where 
winners take all the spoils and losers lick their wounds. Though in 
this dispute the party that had greater weight in the locus of power 
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seemed to have prevailed, the union's strength and perseverance 
to sustain its cause and pursue its aims were equally acknowledged. 
So the feeling that emerged from this dispute was that a more 
rational approach was needed to solve issues in industrial relations. 
The FOI, CMTU and GWU made a formal agreement that wage 
levels in future were to be determined by an incomes policy that 
will take into consideration the cost of living index. The role of 
MCED was recognized as being crucial in this new approach. This 
council drafted the original document that was submitted to 
employers and owners indicating the broad lines of an incomes 
policy to be fashioned by all the social partners. A special tripartite 
unit was created to determine changes in the cost of living, and 
reach consensus on an Incomes Policy, under the auspices of the 
Council. When such an Incomes Policy came into effect, the cost 
of living increase was taken our of the area of contention. Measures 
involving inflationary compensations in wages were no longer to 
be surprises springing out in annual budgets but discussed months 
ahead and with limited Government's intervention in this matter. 
The spirit of compromise epitomized in the Incomes Accord 
(1990-93) was far from superfluous. This agreement by and large 
"succeeded in avoiding major labour untest throughout the 1990's. 
Although the agreement was not renewed upon its termination, 
the cooperation which existed in arriving at an annual cost ofliving 
compensation prevailed" (Human Development Report, 1996, p. 42). 
Hence, one unintended consequence of this dispute was the 
initiation of a social dialogue that was supposed to bring about a 
more conciliatory style ofIndustrial Relations. Low strike statistics 
for this period can be used as tangible evidence of the positive side 
effects of this social dialogue. However, this relative stability was 
severely threatened by another dispute in 1994 that had some 
characteristics similar to the Phoenicia case. This was the industrial 
conflict surrounding the collective agreement at Air Malta. 
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Less Consensual Collective Bargaining:The Conflict related 
to the Collective Agreement at Air Malta 1994-95 
Air Malta was established in 1973 as a result of the Labour 
Government's intention to set up a national airline. Government 
is the major shareholder with 96.4% of the total share. The profit 
it has consistently registered has made it one of the success stories 
in the history of state owned enterprises in Malta. 
Air Malta employees were then represented by four unions: two 
are smaller house unions that cater for the airline pilots and cabin 
crew respectively; while the General Workers' Union caters for 
the industrial and non industrial staff, and the UHM (Union of 
United Workers) has members in various sections of the company. 
It is the GWU that represents the majority of the ground employees 
and over 50% of the total workforce and therefore negotiates with 
management on behalf of all industrial and non-industrial staff 
demands. 
With such a unionised workforce, amicable relations between 
management and labour are essential. For the first twenty years of 
the company's existence, they were so with only minor incidents 
of industrial unrest. This situation was aided by the fact that in 
1978 the GWU entered into a statutory fusion with the Malta 
Labour Party that was at that time in government and remained 
so till 1987. The Government's encouragement of the philosophy 
of worker participation and the introduction of a worker director 
in all public utilities and government owned companies 
contribured to an Indian summer in the field of industrial relations 
at Air Malta. 
The situation changed somewhat in the late eighties and early 
nineties. The end of the statutory fusion between the GWU and 
the Labour Party in 1992, the election of a more right wing 
Christian Democratic Government in 1987 and again (with a larger 
majority) in 1992; and the changes in the economy which it tried 
to generate all formed part of a process that slowly shifted the 
pattern of industrial relations in Malta in a less consensual direction. 
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The 1994 Air Malta industrial conflict centred around the new 
collective agreement that was up for renewal. The main actors 
were the company represented by the chairman, the industrial and 
non-industrial staff represented by the GWU and on occasion the 
Government minister responsible for the company. The bone of 
contention fell into four different categories: the duration of 
negotiations, wages, allowances and work flexibility. 
The collective agreement was due for revision on 1 st April 1994. 
In October 1993, the company invited the union to submit its 
proposals for the revision of the agreement so that negotiations 
could start and finish by the time the existing agreement expired 
(i.e. 31st March 1994). In November 1994, the union submitted 
its proposals. Due to a number of disagreements over demands 
made by the union, the company informed the latter that they 
could not submit their counter proposals before mid-March 1995. 
The union in turn demanded that its original deadline of3 rtl March 
1995 for the submission of counter-proposals had to be kept. When 
this was not adhered to, industrial action followed in the form of a 
three-hour strike. 
The second disagreement was over wage increases. The GWU 
was demanding an increase of salaries that would raise wage scales 
by 22% per annum, arguing that, with the large profits Air Malta 
had made in the preceding year, it could shoulder the burden. The 
company retorted that this demand was totally unreasonable and 
would increase the company payroll by 65%. It also pointed out 
that wage increases should be linked to worker performance. The 
inability to find a compromise led to a seven-hour strike that the 
company tried to stop by referring the conflict to the industrial 
tribunal. However the GWU was not to be deterred and went 
ahead with industrial action nevertheless. The situation was 
resolved with the acceptance of a 7% pay rise. 
The wage disagreements were also linked closely to those 
concerning allowances. Initially, the company refused to increase 
allowances, stating that the increase in salaries had been enough 
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of a burden. Consequently the union declared a 'work-to-rule' 
directive that was countered by an overtime ban, a freeze on annual 
leave, and a freeze on rebates for air travel facilities enjoyed by all 
Air Malta staff. The union's actions continued for three days. At 
this point, the Minister distanced himself from the conflict and 
several social partners made a plea for compromise largely directed 
at the GWU. Agreement was reached with the company 
committing a sum of Lm40,000 over three years in allowances to 
be distributed by the GWU. 
The final dimension to the drawn-out conflict involved the 
wording of a clause (A10) in the collective agreement with regard 
to flexibility. The GWU claimed that this clause was not in 
accordance with the version agreed during the meeting. The Air 
Malta Chairperson claimed that some union members had a vested 
interest in the issue and were trying to sabotage the agreement. 
He was referring to the employees of the ramp section of the 
company, perceived as the most militant (Bonnici, 1996:60). In a 
signed affidavit, the Chairperson and top management declared 
that they had not changed the text of the contested flexibility 
clause from the version agreed with the GWU. On its part, the 
union argued that it was not in a position to sign the agreement, 
since it had been rejected by its members. 
There were several attempts at mediation, but they were all 
unsuccessful. Matters came to a head on November yd when an 
employee of the Cargo Department was transferred to another 
section (Bonnici, 1996, p. 64). On November 9 t h, the GWU 
ordered an indefinite strike in the Cargo Department. This lasted 
until November 14th when, following discussions, the GWU 
accepted the transfer. During these discussions, some slight changes 
were also agreed to Article A10. The collective agreement was 
officially signed by the GWU and the Air Malta Chairperson on 
21 st November 1995. 
Some parallelism can be noticed between this Air Malta case 
and the Phoenicia dispute of 1990, even though the outcome was 
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different. The disputes over time tabling and the flexibility clause 
seem to have been largely an outcome of the GWU's wish to show 
its teeth and reaffirm its position in the capital-labour paradigm, 
asserting its role and indicating that the new liberal neo-capitalist 
environment had not reduced its ability either to act or to affect 
its potential to decide on the outcome of the negotiations. 
The company's stand on the other hand clearly indicates that it 
was determined to push through its agenda against all odds. It 
refused to alter drastically its standard demands and at same time 
insisted on introducing new concepts and expectations from the 
workers by updating the flexibility clause and demanding that 
wage increases and bonuses be linked to work performance. 
As negotiations reached a point where neither showed any 
willingness to budge, the Minister distanced himself from the 
negotiation table. The hidden message was that the final decision 
lay with management. The Minister's decision and Company 
Chairman's threat to close down the airline if a reasonable solution 
was not found are indicative of the aggressive non-compromising 
approach adopted by the management. The pattern set in the 
Phoenicia case of 1990 seemed to have been followed. The outcome 
was however different because in this case the company was a 
parastatal rather than a transnational one. 
Nevertheless, the damage inflicted on the firm by their own 
staff in both the Phoenicia and Air Malta disputes are a reminder 
that real gains can only be made when industrial relations is 
epitomised by a philosophy of compromise and consensus that 
recognises the importance and contribution of both partners. 
Still, any such 'social dialogue' did not prove effective in solving 
the conflict that arose between Government and trade unions over 
the austere measures announced for the 1998 budget. 
Defining a Trade Dispute 
In the Parliamentary si tting of yh November 1997, the Minister 
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of Finance announced that various measures had to be taken in 
order to stabilise the precarious situation of public finance. The 
measure included a hefty rise in water and electricity rates and an 
increase in the price of petrol. There was a general reaction to 
these measures. Naturally the trade union movement voiced its 
concern. 
The General Workers' Union (GWU) adopted a policy of 
marking time by appointing a commission to study and draw a 
report on the likely impact of these measures on various categories 
of workers. The Union of United Workers (UHM) issued a press 
release on 6th November, stating that the proposed measures would 
put a heavy financial burden on all workers, especially those of the 
middle and lower income bracket. It asked for a meeting with the 
Minister of Finance in order to find a solution to the problems 
which the implementation of these budget measures were likely 
to cause. On its part the Government said that these measures 
were taken in order to rein in the national debt. 
A meeting was held between the Minister of Finance and the 
UHM on 14th November 1997 during which the union reaffirmed 
its position that the burden of the financial deficit should be 
shouldered by high-income earners. Another meeting was held on 
9 th December. A press release issued by the Department of 
Information stated that the Government could not accept the UHM 
proposal ofLm2 weekly increase in addition to Lml.S0 announced 
in the budget to compensate for the cost of living increases or to 
stagger the new water and electricity rate over a period of five 
years. The Minister of Finance said that, if Government were to 
accept anyone of these proposals, the stabilization of the precarious 
financial situation would not materialise. 
No other meetings were held. In a letter sent to the Parliamentary 
Secretary at the office of the Prime Minister, the UHM registered 
an industrial dispute with Government about the 1998 budget. 
The Government was officially informed by this letter that the 
UHM was free to take industrial action in the public service sector 
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as well as in companies or corporations where the state had a 
majority or minority shareholding. 
On 6 th January 1998, the UHM issued the first directives to all 
civil servants and employees in parastatal organizations, instructing 
them to refrain from answering telephones and from making use 
of fax machines and e-mails. They were also instructed to 'work to 
rule'. The union stated that it had drawn up a plan of action that 
would be implemented if the Government failed to revise the water 
and electricity rates announced in the budget. 
The partial industrial action was stepped up on 12th January 
1998. Employees at the Customs Department were instructed not 
to process any import or export documents and the workers at the 
Freeport Terminal were directed not to do any work related to 
containers that were either Malta bound or leaving the island. These 
directives had an immediate effect on the industrial and commercial 
sector. The employers expressed their grave concern stating that 
the private sector, which was not involved in a trade dispute, was 
being hit hard by these industrial actions. The UHM replied that 
as a trade union it was bound to give precedence to workers' and 
pensioners' rights over all other issues. 
On lS'h January, access to Malta Freeport was blocked with 
containers. The UHM stated that the action was taken to retaliate 
to the initiative taken by the police. The union alleged that, in 
order to allow imports into the country, the police had forced open 
the gates to the quays at the Grand Harbour and groupage terminal 
at Hal Far. The government accused the union that by taking this 
action, it was going beyond the provisions laid down in the 
industrial law that safeguard the rights of workers and citizens. 
The Prime Minister said that the union's action had overstepped 
the limits allowed by the law and called on the union to stop 
acting macho. The police commissioner was also quoted as saying 
that the action of the strikers at the Freeport did not amount to 
fair picketing but intimidation (The Times, 20.1.98). On its part, 
the UHM claimed that the police action was illegal. It further 
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stated that its industrial actions were about to be stepped up and 
would only stop when there was a positive reaction from the 
Government side. However on 20[h January the UHM suspended 
its actions. In its statement the union said that this decision was 
taken because it feared that the police actions might lead to serious 
incidents. 
In the meantime, the Freeport Terminal p.l.e. sued the UHM 
for the damages caused by the industrial action and it requested 
the court to hear this case with urgency. The company contended 
that since no trade dispute existed with the trade union and the 
collective agreement had been honoured, the industrial actions 
taken by UHM at the Freeport were illegal and abusive. It therefore 
claimed that the UHM was responsible for all the damages caused 
to the company and for any others that the company might suffer 
as a result. 
In its reply, the UHM maintained that in its dealings with 
Government it had offered two options: staggering increases of 
electricity tariffs over five years or granting a Lm2 weekly wage 
increase over and above the Lml.50 announced in the budget as a 
cost of living increase. Since these offers were both rejected, it 
deemed that it had a right, according to the Industrial Relations 
Act, to take industrial action targeted at public enterprises. The 
UHM secretary general made an appeal to the judge not to restrict 
trade union action by his sentence (Nazzjon Taghna, 2l.l.98). 
In a landmark sentence, the judge said that the UHM did not 
succeed in proving that its dispute with Government over measures 
announced in the budget was 'in furtherance of a trade dispute'. 
He claimed that there is no provision at law that would render the 
matter as a trade dispute. Furthermore, Government had the right 
to govern and making taxes was a natural and legitimate exercise 
of this right. In its ruling, the court therefore upheld the plaintiff's 
request and declared the industrial action ordered by the UHM at 
the Freeport Terminal as illegal and abusive. The case was 
postponed to quantify damages caused to the company. 
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In the meantime, the GWU published the report that it had 
commissioned to study the impact of the budgetary measures. 
According to this report these measures were likely to raise the 
cost ofliving by 2.4%. It suggested that rebates be given on water 
and electricity bills and recommended that an income supplement 
be given to two-member households made up of pensioners who 
depend on social security benefits for their living. 
The ruling of this court set a demarcation line in trade union 
action beyond which the immunity established in Section 17 of 
the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) does not apply. In such 
circumstances a trade union can be sued for torts and damages 
resulting from its actions. In other words industrial actions to make 
pressure on Government to change its budgetary measures are not 
protected by the law because, according to the Judge, "they are 
political rather than trade disputes". The union did not agree about 
this demarcation and lodged an appeal. 
In its ruling on May 30th 2001, after three anxious years of 
anticipation, the Court of Appeal revoked this decision of the civil 
court. In its sentence, it stated that since the budget measures 
were likely to have a negative impact on the unions members' 
salaries, it was bound to affect conditions of employment. Therefore, 
according to the Court of Appeal, the dispute between UHM and 
Government was connected with terms and conditions of 
employment. The Industrial Relations Act (IRA) does not specify, 
as the 1982 amendment to the English Law does, that for a trade 
dispute to exist it has to be related wholly and mainly to conditions 
of employment. Due to the absence of such a specific restriction in 
the IRA, the UHM/Government dispute can be defined as a trade 
dispute and the Appeals Court granted the immunity for damages 
as provided in the law. However, the Court also stated that the 
blockade of the Freeport was abusive and illegal, as this did not 
constitute peaceful picketing. 
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Bickering 
The bickering between Government and trade unions about the 
austere measures in the budget continued until the snap general 
elections of September 1998 when the Nationalist Party (NP) was 
returned to power. By the end of 1998, an agreement was reached 
between the trade unions and the Government abour a reduction 
in the water and electricity tariffs. However towards the end of 
this particular year, there was another bour of bickering between 
the trade union and employers. 
In October of 1998, the Federation ofIndustries (FOI) published 
the results of a Benchmarking Exercise that consisted of a 
comparative analysis between Malta and EU countries, USA and 
Japan based on statistics drawn mainly from OECD, the European 
Commission and other national and international institutions. This 
report became a source of bickering between the Trade Union 
Movement and the Federation of Industries (FOI). 
In this Benchmarking Exercise the FOI focussed on the gap 
between public spending over the past decade and state revenue. 
The study showed that Malta "registered a deficit four times higher 
than the Maastricht criteria". A comparative statistical data revealed 
that Malta is among the big debtors when compared to EU member 
states. The main contributory factor to this huge deficit, according 
to the FOI, is the excessive number of public sector employees 
that, in percentage terms, is higher than the EU average, USA and 
Japan. 
Complementary to this Benchmarking exercise, the FOI 
published a set of recommendations for the Government Budget. 
These recommendations urged Government to commit itself to a 
programme of privatisation, streamline the social service system; 
introduce an incentive scheme to promote private pension schemes 
that would supplement basic public pensions and to engage in a 
systematic downsizing of public sector. The statutory wage increase 
based on the indexation of the Retail Price Index better known as 
COLA (Cost of Living Adjustment) was, in the opinion of the 
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FOI, proving too much of a burden for industry and should 
therefore be suspended. Any wage increase in the manufacturing 
sector was to be given only on the basis of productivity. Moreover 
to enhance productivity it was also suggested to reduce five days 
from the number of the workers' annual entitlement of vacation 
leave. 
The Benchmarking exercise together with these 
recommendations raised the ire of the trade union movement. 
Indeed the 'us and them' dichotomy, which seemed to have been 
dropped from the discourse of most workers' representatives, 
became once more the rallying cry of trade unions. The FOI was 
depicted as an organization that was attempting to shift undue 
burdens onto workers while asking for no sacrifices from its 
members. The GWU Secretary General was quoted as saying: "why 
should employees have to suffer while those who are comfortable 
continue to have it easy" (The Times, 27.10.98). The UHM used 
a similar tone, condemning what it called an attempt at "passing 
the buck" to workers. The trade unions opined that curbing tax 
evasion might prove to be better solution to solve Malta's budgetary 
deficit, adding that the ones who evade paying taxes tend to be 
FOI members rather than workers. The press was swamped with 
such statements during October and November 1998. The GWU 
even accused the FOI of having a hidden agenda and of acting as 
the Government spokesperson. The confrontation reached such 
fever pitch that a particular newspaper reported that "at one point, 
physical violence was being threatened" at MeED meeting (The 
Malta Independent, 20.11.98). 
The FOI responded to this criticism by appealing to "those who 
took up the cudgels against it to focus a bit on the message instead 
of the messenger" and reburted the accusation that it was acting 
on behalf of Government (The Times, 15.11.98). It reaffirmed 
that the objective of the Benchmarking Exercise was to provide a 
graphic and realistic view of the Maltese economy. The FOI 
president stated that, in its Benchmarking Exercise, the Federation 
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was simply sounding an alarm bell and it was not its intention to 
take the country into a "doom syndrome" or open confrontation 
with the trade unions (The Times, 20.1l.98). 
Various pleas were made, especially in newspapers editorials (The 
Malta Independent, 20.1l.1998; The Times, 18.1l.98) to let the 
MeED act as the platform for discussion where agreement or 
consensus can be reached. The trade unions and the FOI tacitly 
accepted these proposals. Once more, as in 1990, this tripartite 
institution took centre stage as a forum for amicable settlement of 
controversial issues. However this benchmarking exercise seemed 
to have been a propitious time for the trade union movement to 
convey its message in very clear terms that its participation in the 
new corporatist policy of the 1990's did not mean total acquiescence 
to the forces and vagaries of the market. 
Thus, the year 1998 started with a serious conflict between trade 
unions and Government and ended with this bickering between 
employers and workers' representatives. The collaborative spirit 
of tripartism gave way to a less consensual ethic. The events that 
unfolded in 1999 were to jeopardise further this consensus. 
Trade Union Recognition and Inter-Union Conflict 
In December 1999, 17 top officials of the General Workers' Union 
(GWU) including the union's secretary general, president and legal 
advisor were arraigned in court charged with having violently 
resisted police officials, obstructing the police in their duties and 
threatening police officials. These incidences were alleged to have 
happened as a number of employees of the Malta International 
Airport (MIA) were being taken on a bus to the police depot to be 
questioned about damages caused to MIA property and equipment 
during a strike action ordered by the GWU at the airport. 
The GWU claimed that these employees were arrested while 
they were obeying legitimate directives issued by their union in 
an industrial dispute. It further stated that the mass arrest were 
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illegal, an abuse of power and in violation of both the Constitution 
and the European Convention of Human Rights. 
These incidents sparked a heated and highly confrontational 
debate between the GWU and the Government. The latter claimed 
that the criminal proceedings instituted against the members and 
officials of the GWU did not constitute any breach of constitutional 
and human rights. Once these people overstepped the limits of 
the law, they no longer enjoyed immunity from criminal 
proceedings as contemplated by the Industrial Relations Act 
(1976). In a democratic country, continued arguing the 
Government, the police had every right to take action in pursuance 
of their duty to preserve law and order. 
The GWU retorted by accusing Government and the police 
authorities that the court actions were nothing but thinly veiled, 
concerted efforts to undermine the GWU and the whole trade 
union movement. In its stand, it sought and obtained the support 
of several trade unions from overseas which sent letters to the 
Maltese Prime Minister condemning the police action at the airport 
during the GWU strike. The International Transport Federation 
(ITF) was the most vociferous in its support and some of its 
members who happened to be in Malta for an international 
conference extended their stay to accompany the GWU members 
who were being arraigned in court on November 30th • In front of 
the court buildings they displayed a banner with the words "Trade 
Unionists are not Criminals". The International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was equally strong in its support and 
it lodged a formal complaint with the ILO accusing the Maltese 
Government of ignoring international conventions on labour rights. 
Its General Secretary, Bill Jordan, was quoted as saying that its 
executive board and the ITF "would monitor any court proceedings 
carefully and stand ready to take appropriate action in case of 
violation of internationally established trade union rights" (The 
Times, 8.l.2000). On the other hand, the Maltese Government 
insisted that the trade unions abroad were being misinformed by 
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the GWu. The Deputy Prime Minister commented that "a judicial 
system exists in a democracy to see whether there was a breach of 
law or not" (The Times, 22.1.2000). 
The Source of this Inter Union Conflict 
What sparked this conflict was an issue over trade union recognition 
at the Malta International Airport (MIA) between the GWU and 
the Union of United Workers (UHM). Following is an account of 
the events as reported in the Maltese press that led to this impasse. 
In 1995 a secret ballot was held among the 250 workers at the 
MIA to decide which trade union was to represent them. The result 
gave the UHM a majority of 17. Subseguently negotiation started 
between MIA management and the UHM and a collective 
agreement was signed covering the period 1995 - 1997. In May 
1998,500 employees from the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) 
were transferred to the MIA but given the option to revert to their 
department if they wished to do so. On May 8th 1998, the GWU 
wrote to the MIA informing it that as a trade union it now 
represented an absolute majority of workers in the company and 
should therefore be given sole recognition. The MIA chairperson 
and Director of Labour acceded to the GWU's reguest; however, 
the UHM contested these decisions. It maintained that the DCA 
employees who had been transferred had not yet renounced their 
rights to go back to their previous employment; hence they could 
not be considered to be MIA workers. The UHM referred the case 
to the Industrial Tribunal. 
In its award on July 21 st 1999, the Tribunal stated that, unless 
employees renounce to their rights to be transferred to the original 
place of work, they could not be considered as employees of MIA. 
This award was interpreted by the UHM that it still had sole 
recognition at the MIA. The GWU replied that this was not the 
interpretation of the Tribunal. In the meantime a number of 
workers in the fire fighting division, all members of the GWU, 
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renounced to their right to revert to DCA. The GWU requested 
the MIA to take this renunciation into consideration when assessing 
its claim as representative of the majority of company employees. 
Furthermore, it warned the MIA not to conduct any negotiations 
with the UHM as otherwise it would give notice of industrial 
action. Eventually it gave a deadline date (August l3'h) to the 
MIA for it to start negotiations with the GWU with a view to 
endorsing a new collective agreement. The MIA referred the case 
to the Industrial Tribunal. The GWU accused the MIA 
management of resorting to delaying tactics 
On the expiry of the deadline (13 th August), partial industrial 
action was announced by the GWU and employees were instructed 
not to use telephones and other means of communication. Later it 
directed workers not to do any work connected with trolleys, bulky 
luggage, the x-ray machine and vehicles. The GWU claimed that 
its industrial action was causing lack of security at the airport. 
The UHM advised its members to ignore the GWU directives. 
The GWU insisted on holding a secret ballot among workers to 
decide which of the two trade unions had the majority. In its 
statements, the GWU accused the company of intransigence 
because nothing was being done to solve the issue. On 18'h August 
1999, the GWU stepped up its actions by issuing directives to 
the 98 members of the Fire Section to strike from 10.20 am to 5 
pm. The Minister for Economic Services defined this action as 
irresponsible, arguing that the GWU should have waited for the 
decision of the tribunal which was due to meet in two days' time. 
When the tribunal was convened on 19th August, the GWU 
asked whether this sitting was meant to interpret its previous award 
or to deliberate a new decision. This question was raised since in 
the meantime a number of workers in the fire division, all members 
of the GWU, had renounced their right to revert to the DCA. The 
union contested that one member of the tribunal, who was 
occupying the post of president of the Confederation of Malta Trade 
Unions (CMTU) to which the UHM is affiliated, had already 
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expressed an opinion about this matter before the tribunal. As 
such it requested his abstention. It further stated that the position 
of the other member on the Tribunal was also untenable since he 
was an official of the Malta Employers' Association, which had 
publicly criticised the GWU for its industrial action. When the 
chairperson of the Industrial Tribunal informed the Unions that 
its two requests had been turned down the union filed a case to 
contend this ruling before the civil court. This forced the tribunal 
to adjourn sine die. 
On August 21 st, the GWU ordered a six and a half hour stoppage 
at the airport from 10.00 am to 4.30 pm. Disputes arose between 
fire section workers who were on strike and others who were not. 
The police intervened to resume operations. The airport authorities 
filed an application for a warrant of prohibitory injunction against 
trade union action at the airport. The Civil Court ruled that the 
GWU and the UHM could not call industrial action at the airport 
over the issue of recognition as they had no dispute with the MIA 
that falls under the terms defined at law. It therefore concluded 
that actions taken in pursuit of directives issued by unions against 
MIA could not qualify for immunity in terms of Industrial 
Relations Act. 
In the meantime, MIA employees, members of the GWU, were 
arrested by the police following reports that damage had been 
caused to MIA equipment. GWU officials stopped the police bus 
that was taking these employees to police headquarters by blocking 
a major road. The Prime Minister accused the GWU of creating 
unnecessary hardships and problems by its irresponsible actions. 
The GWU held a press conference during which its general 
secretary stated that the union officials were denied permission by 
the authorities and the police to speak to the workers. He also 
alleged that the police had manhandled and wounded workers on 
strike. These kinds of exchanges between government and union 
became highly confrontational and became harsher in language 
when the GWU members and officials were summoned to court. 
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The GWU even refused to take part in the official ceremonies 
organised by the Government in connection with the celebrations 
of the new millennium. The UHM kept on insisting that the 
decision of the Industrial Tribunal had granted it sole recognition. 
Epilogue 
Amid these controversies, discussions between the two trade unions 
were being held under the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime 
Minister who acted as a mediator. An agreement was finally reached 
and signed on March 27'h 2000, which stipulated that the two 
trade unions would start negotiating a joint collective agreement, 
which would expire in December 2000. Two months after the 
signing of this agreement, the DCA workers transferred on loan 
to the MIA would be asked to take a final decision about their 
employment with the MIA. Once this decision is taken, a secret 
ballot would be held by means of which the workers would decide 
which union they would like to represent them. 
After the signing of this agreement, a presidential pardon was 
issued to the GWU members and officials who were being 
arraigned in court in connection with the industrial action at the 
airport and the incidents that ensued. The Prime Minister was 
quoted as saying that he had signed the recommendation because 
he believed it would be in the best interest of the nation. In view 
of this presidential pardon, the magistrates in charge of the cases 
against the GWU members and officials stopped the proceedings. 
On its part, the GWU stated that it had never asked for a pardon 
and during a press conference displayed the various faxes it had 
received from foreign trade unions expressing their support to the 
union. It also stated that it intended to proceed with its case in 
front of the ILO. 
The case instituted by the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU) to the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) against the Maltese Government in the MIA dispute was 
Flashpoints in Local Industrial Relations in the I990s 55 
heard during ILO Session 278, held in Geneva on 17th June 2000. 
The ILO Committee could not conclude that that the government 
order of evicting strikers or the corresponding police action were 
in violation of the principles of freedom of association. The 
Committee further stated that the case "would probably have been 
dealt with more effectively had the national legislation been clear 
on recognition disputes, representation and legitimate restrictions 
on industrial action". It requested the Maltese Government to 
amend the industrial and labour legislation to clead y define trade 
union recognition as a legitimate subject for a trade dispute. 
The ILO Committee could not condemn the decision taken by 
MIA to solve the issue through court action since the award of the 
Industrial Tribunal on trade union recognition at MIA was 
ambiguous. The company could neither make use of a secret ballot 
as one of the unions opposed it and it was not clear which employees 
would have been eligible to vote. 
From the evidence provided - film footage and process verbal -
the ILO Committee could not conclude that the police had used 
excessive force in dealing with strikers. It however pointed out 
that a trade union had a right to discuss occupational issues at the 
premises. This constitutes one of the principles of freedom of 
association. The company could be exonerated from infringing 
this principle because it did not interfere when the GWU found 
an alternative meeting place. 
In its reaction to this report, the GWU secretary general said 
that the recommendations made by ILO were directed at the 
government. None were made to the GWu. The ILO ruling would 
serve as a deterrent to Government in future not to act the way it 
did in August 1999. According to ILO standards, industrial action 
over trade union recognition is legal. However the Maltese 
Government took the GWU to court with a plea to the magistrate 
to define the GWU industrial action as illegal. The ILO 
recommended amending the law in order to make the issue of 
trade union recognition less ambiguous. "In the end, we obtained 
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what we wanted from the ILO and the Government should now 
abide by what the ILO governing body said" (GWU Secretary 
General, reported in The Times, 2l.06.2000). 
The Deputy Prime Minister stated that "everything the union 
accused us of was unfounded and has been dismissed by the ILO. 
The report in fact certifies the seriousness of Government's dealings 
with the situation. Indeed the report should open the GWU's eyes 
to the fact that it cannot treat other issues like it treated the one at 
MIA and that solutions are to be found meeting round a table and 
not on the street or by waging unnecessary strikes"(The Times, 
21.06.2000). 
The ICFTU secretary, Ms Hoddle, was quoted as saying: "We 
are satisfied with the report. When the law lacks clear definitions, 
the Government can see to that ... We are here to see that trade 
union rights are upheld and we are satisfied that the issue had 
been solved locally" (The Times, 21.06.2000). 
Conclusion 
A dispute over trade union recognition developed into a drama 
involving various actors. The GWU undertook industrial action 
at Malta International Airport to drive its point home. A series of 
events snowballed into a scene: trade union leaders prevented from 
addressing employees by not being allowed access to prohibitory 
areas; intervention by the police; alleged damage to MIA property; 
arrest and removal of employees; blockage of a major public road 
by GWU officials; the ensuing scuffles between these officials and 
the police and the arraignment of trade union officials in court. 
Finally the case was referred to ILO. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this drama. First 
it manifests that trade unions have to operate in a society and 
polity that is truly plutalistic. A society has to strike the right 
balance between democratic principles and social control. Its 
mechanism to maintain social order may impinge on trade union 
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action. Secondly trade unions, like any other active groups, often 
find themselves operating on the margins oflegality and rationality. 
They may, in such circumstances, decide that stepping over the 
defined boundary of acceptability and propriety is a worthwhile 
risk to take, and sometimes impossible to avoid, in order to drive 
a key message home (Baldacchino et al.! 1999). However, in a ruling 
of a case instiruted by MIA, the court confirmed a decision it had 
taken in January 1998 in the case of the Freeport Terminal p.l.e. 
against UHM: it set definite limits on the trade union action. 
This endgame was happening precisely at the same time while 
the GWU and Government were locked in another dispute over 
the contractual obligations of Government towards Kalaxlokk 
workers. This case will be dealt with in the next section. 
Redundancies & Contractual Obligations 
In 1986 Kalaxlokk Co. Ltd. was set up to take over the work being 
carried by two parastatal companies - Kalafrana Construction and 
Xlokk Construction. These two companies that were engaged in 
the construction of the Freeport were running into serious financial 
difficulties. Kalaxlokk took the almost 1,800 employees of both 
companies on its books. 
After its election victory in 1987, the Nationalist Government 
embarked on a policy of reducing the number of these employees, 
with a key Minister claiming that "the company had no programme 
of works that was in any way compatible with the number of 
employees on its payroll" (Falzon, M. reported in The Times, 
19.7.1999). Between 1987 and 1991, there was a decrease of over 
800 employees from the labour force of the company. In 1991, the 
Government introduced a voluntary scheme by means of which it 
offered a sum of money to those workers who left on their own 
accord. 
In 1994, Novita Construction Ltd., a private consortium, was 
awarded the contract for the building of Terminal II at the Freeport. 
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In its contract Novita pledged to take on the workers for 50 years. 
The GWU that represented the workers did not recognize this 
agreement. In November 1994 an agreement was signed between 
the GWU and Government in which it was stated that Kalaxlokk 
should still be considered as a parastatal company and that its 
workers would remain in employment. As the Terminal II project 
was nearing completion, the employment of these workers was 
under threat since the company had no alternative work orders. 
Following industrial action in 1996, Government pledged itself 
in an agreement signed with the GWU that every effort should be 
made to find alternative employment to those workers for whom 
there was no work available at the company. This had to be done 
in accordance with the agreement of 1994. However the surplus 
of workers, due to a decrease in workload, was such that this 
problem proved too difficult to solve. In January 1998 the Labour 
Government, elected in October 1996, agreed to absorb these 
workers in parastatal corporations. However, the draft of the legal 
amendment necessary for this policy to take effect was not yet 
made by the time (September 1998) that the Nationalist Party 
was returned to power following a snap election. The new Minister 
for Economic Services stated in Parliament that forcing parastatal 
corporations to rectuit Kalaxlokk redundant workers would mean 
that Government would be giving preference to the latter over 
those who had been registering for work. This was not considered 
to be fair by the Minister and he pleaded for another solution to 
the problem. Thus, in January 1999, Government proposed the 
following scheme: 
- Kalaxlokk Employees under 55 years of age will be given 
Lm400 for every year of service since 1986 as terminal benefits. 
They will have to renounce the right to notice money but 
will have a right to register for employment. Those who 
manage to find alternative employment would still be entitled 
to benefits. 
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- Employees aged 55 and over will be given a full pension if 
they retire. 
For this scheme to go ahead, Government was willing to fork 
out up to Lm2.52 million, provided that at least 200 employees 
would take up the offer (The Times, 21.1.99). At this time, 
Kalaxlokk had 477 employees on its books with an annual wage 
bill of about Lm2.4 million. 
The GWU did not accept this proposal, arguing that Government 
was only abdicating its responsibilities by laying off workers 
through this scheme. It insisted that Government had obliged 
itself to guarantee the workers' job in the 1994 agreement and 
was therefore obliged to find them alternative employment. The 
union however said that it would not oppose the implementation 
of the scheme provided that it was on a voluntary basis and those 
who would opt to refuse this golden handshake would not be 
discriminated against. The union made a plea for more dialogue 
and meetings to find a solution. The Prime Minister was quoted 
as saying (The Times, 23.1.99) that the Government was still 
interested in continuing discussion to find a solution that would 
enjoy the support of all interested parties. 
This willingness by both parties to enter into discussion was 
followed by intense and prolonged negotiations. These were 
finalised in June when the union accepted the following proposal 
made by the Government: 
- Workers who voluntarily terminate their employment with 
the company will each be given a sum of Lm900 for every 
year of service with the company. The money will be paid as 
a tax free, lump sum. 
- Such workers would still be eligible to register as unemployed 
and to receive all other social security benefits. 
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- The company reserved the right to refuse any application. 
- For the scheme to be put into effect as least 200 of the 477 
workers on the company books have to apply. 
- Those who opt to remain in employment with Kalaxlokk 
will be guaranteed that their working conditions as stipulated 
in the 1996 collective agreement will remain operative. 
Sources close to the company were expecting that at least 300 of 
the 477 employees would apply to leave (The Times, 9.7.99). The 
prevailing assumption was that this scheme had brought to an 
end a controversial issue that had beset Government and union for 
years. However, by the date set as a deadline in the agreement, 
fewer than 200 workers, the target set in the agreement, had applied 
to leave and to accept the termination benefits. In view of this 
unexpected low response to the offer, the Government stated that 
it had to review and assess the situation. The company should 
only be viable with a drastically trimmed workforce. Sources close 
to Government were quoted as saying that the Government was 
determined to close down Kalaxlokk unless the GWU was able to 
offer a proposal that would make the company viable (The Times, 
16.7.99). The chairperson of MIMCOL, the company overseeing 
state enterprises, was quoted as saying "some remedies have not 
worked, surgery will now be applied". (The Times, 16.7.99). 
These press statements, claimed the GWU, were part of an 
orchestrated campaign to mobilize public opinion against the 
workers and justify the liquidation of the company and the 
subsequent dismissals of workers. The union held firm to its stand 
that the Government, according to the agreement signed in 1994, 
could not abdicate its responsibilities towards these workers. 
Meetings between Government and union were resumed. It was 
finally decided to extend the deadline and give Kalaxlokk 
employees an opportunity to reconsider their position. The response 
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this time proved to be to the Government's satisfaction as, by the 
time of the new deadline, 277 employees had handed in their letter 
of resignation. 
With 186 workers left on the books of the company, the 
Government was laying out plans to sell it to a private investor. 
The G WU warned Government not to take a unilateral decision 
and to consult it before making such a move. This issue seemed to 
be once more heading towards an amicable solution. However a 
new controversy arose about the guarantee fund. The union claimed 
that according to the agreement Government was bound to provide 
a fund to guarantee termination benefits for those workers who 
remained in employment with Kalaxlokk. 
The Government proposed to finance a guarantee fund for those 
Kalaxlokk workers who had opted for the golden handshake scheme 
but were retained by the company because their skills fitted with 
the company's needs. The GWU refused this offer, stating that 
according to the agreement signed on the 18th June 1999, the 
Government was bound to guarantee termination benefits for all 
Kalaxlokk workers. To force Government to reconsider its decision, 
the union ordered the harbour pilots not to assist ships carrying 
fuel for Enemalta. Mediation talks got underway and on 26th 
August 1999 an agreement was reached between the GWU and 
Government. The two sides agreed on the setting up of a guarantee 
fund of Lm l.2 million to be utilised by workers in case of 
redundancy. 
Both sides claimed victory over this issue. The Prime Minister 
was quoted as saying that the previous offer made by the 
Government had been more beneficial to the workers and that the 
GWU had lost "the battles it chose to fight" (The Times, 29.8.99). 
In contrast, the editorial of the GWU-owned paper L-Orizzont 
(28.8.99) claimed that the fact that all Kalaxlokk workers - and 
not just those listed as remaining with the company - would be 
benefiting from the fund was a substantial improvement over the 
previous offer. 
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General Conclusions 
One may claim that the events of 1990's did not cause any major 
alteration in the power relations between the actors involved in 
local industrial relations. The outcome of the Phoenicia dispute in 
the first months of 1990 did act as a spur to employers to call for 
changes in the legislation to curtail trade union power as regards 
for example the right to order a sympathy strike. However, no 
changes were effected. 
The social dialogue begun in 1990 through the incomes policy 
was maintained even when there was change of government in 
1996. Indeed in the 1990's the Maltese industrial relations system 
is characterised by bargaining at two different levels: at enterprise 
level through single collective bargaining and at national level at 
the Malta Council of Economic Development (MCED). While at 
the MCED trade union representatives together with the other 
social partners agreed on an annual cost of living adjustment 
(COLA) based on a retail price index (RPI), they continued 
negotiating other wage increases over and above COLA for their 
members through collective bargaining at enterprise level. 
Nevertheless, the events of the 1990's show that social partnership 
is not synonymous with industrial peace and harmony. The 
institutional set-up of social partnership offered a platform where 
the different interests of workers and employers were recognised 
and the collective representation of their interest accepted. But it 
did not always prove to be an effective mechanism for solving the 
industrial conflicts that occurred. 
The disputes of the 1990's also show that unions are not only 
pure and simple collective bargaining agencies but they also try to 
protect employee interests beyond the workplace. The workers' 
rights as consumers can only be enhanced by improving, or at 
least maintaining, the purchasing power of their pay packet. The 
stand taken by the unions over the high rises in water and electricity 
bills announced in the Budget for 1998 was aimed towards the 
maintenance of this purchasing power. The trade unions also 
Flashpoints in Local Industrial Relations in the I990s 63 
claimed that the RPI upon which the rate of inflation is based was 
in need of revision to reflect the present state of the market needs 
of the individual. In its memorandum to the Government over 
the 1999 Budget, the GWU recommended that the RPI should 
be compiled by an independent body (such as the National Statistics 
Office), reporting directly to Parliament. 
This effective brokerage of a trade-off between different interests 
and their resistance to any measures that adversely affect the wage 
packet are manifestation of the resilience of trade unions. They 
managed to maintain their position as the obvious legitimate force 
of organised opposition. However, as the events of 1990's show, in 
their opposition stance they have to solve the dilemma as to what 
is lawful and what is not. The Government sought to draw 
demarcation lines over trade union action, perhaps to gain some 
control over this opposition. The Civil Court, in two separate cases, 
ruled that the industrial action taken by trade unions was not in 
furtherance of a trade dispute. These rulings may have provided 
Government with some form of control in the industrial relations 
scenario (at least until one of these rulings was revoked by a Court 
of Appeal). The need to update our industrial law and define clearly 
trade union recognition as a trade dispute was spelt out by the 
International Labour Organisation. 
Thus the integrative and collaborative spirit upon which 
industrial relations in 1990's were designed did not always prevail. 
But the evidence suggests that there was no subversive plot to 
abort this spirit. The Maltese Governments of the 1990's sought 
to incorporate trade unions into the formulation of national labour 
economic and social policy, rather than trying to marginalise them. 
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